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Abstract:  Secure broadcasting is an essential feature for critical operations in wireless 
sensor  network  (WSNs).  However,  due  to  the  limited  resources  of  sensor  networks, 
verifying the authenticity for broadcasted messages is a very difficult issue. µTESLA is a 
broadcast authentication protocol, which uses network-wide loose time synchronization with 
one-way hashed keys to provide the authenticity  verification. However, it suffers from 
several flaws considering the delay tolerance, and the chain length restriction. In this paper, 
we propose a protocol which provides broadcast authentication for wireless sensor networks. 
This protocol uses a nested hash chain of two different hash functions and the Chinese 
Remainder Theorem (CRT). The two different nested hash functions are employed for the 
seed updating and the key generation. Each sensor node is challenged independently with a 
common  broadcasting  message  using  the  CRT.  Our  algorithm  provides  forward  and  
non-restricted  key  generation,  and  in  addition,  no  time  synchronization  is  required. 
Furthermore,  receivers  can  instantly  authenticate  packets  in  real  time.  Moreover,  the 
comprehensive analysis shows that this scheme is efficient and practical, and can achieve 
better performance than the µTESLA system. 
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1. Introduction 
Achieving broadcast security is a must for wireless sensor networks; hence it is necessary for the 
base station to broadcast commands and data to sensor nodes. Without secure communication, sensors 
may be involved in incorrect operations and can’t meet the network requirements. The current security 
solutions for wired and wireless networks cannot be utilized for a wireless sensor network because of 
the energy, memory and computation restrictions of the latter. These limitations make the design and 
operation completely dissimilar to those of regular wireless networks. Broadcast authentication based 
on asymmetric key cryptography  cannot deal with the limited resource  constrains. Symmetric key 
cryptography and hash functions are cheaper in their computational requirements and are more widely 
utilized in sensor networks [1,2]. WSNs’ broadcast authentication was first covered by TESLA [3], 
and  µTESLA  [4]  that  provides  the  asymmetric  cryptographic  property  of  authenticated  broadcast 
through delayed disclosing (time-varying) of symmetric keys. The base-station installs a key chain by 
repeatedly applying a one way hash function (OWHF) to an initial random value, called seed. The 
chain  construction  allows  nodes  to  verify  the  authenticity  of  the  disclosed  keys.  Loosely  time 
synchronized  and  MAC  (Message  Authentication  Code)  generations  are  required.  Revelation  of 
session keys by the base-station is delayed, thus allowing nodes to verify the key validity.  
Multilevel µTESLA [5] is proposed to reduce the need to reinitialize the network by implementing 
multiple  levels  of  key  chains,  in  which  high-level  keys  are  used  to  communicate  root-keys  (or 
commitments) for low-level chains, which are used in turn for broadcast authentication as in standard 
µTESLA. Network lifetime is extended. Significant computation and storage are required. Receivers 
can’t deal with the received messages instantly and have to store them within one or several time 
intervals. Considering the broadcasting of urgent messages like alerts and alarms; the TESLA family 
has great shortcomings in dealing with such matters. Furthermore, the delayed authentication can be 
subject to Denial-of-Services (DoS) attacks. Merkle tree utilization [6] was introduced to overcome 
this  shortage  in  bandwidth  and  storage  resources  utilization.  TIK  [7]  was  proposed  to  achieve 
immediate authentication based on sensitive time synchronization between the sink and the receiving 
nodes. However, this technique is not suitable for WSNs, as mentioned by its inventors. Sensor nodes 
have a limited battery life, which can make using asymmetric key techniques impractical as they use 
much more energy for their mathematical calculations. We propose a new algorithm that uses two 
different types of hash functions, which come with a nested chain and the Chinese Reminder Theorem 
in order to get a common broadcasting message. The resulting chain provides the forwardness and the 
infiniteness, and no process restarting is required. The proposed protocol is compared with others in 
terms of its computational cost and security attributes.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the related work, Section 3 
discuses  the  required  attributes,  Section  4  proposes  our  new  algorithm,  Section  5  evaluates  our Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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scheme’s  performance,  Section  6  analyzes  the  security  attributes,  and  finally  Section  7  concludes  
the paper. 
 
2. Related Work 
The  following  subsection  discuses  some  of  the  schemes  related  to  WSN  authentication 
broadcasting. Their efficiency and shortcomings according to the desirable security attributes that will 
be discussed will also be illustrated. 
2.1. Lamport’s Scheme 
Hash chains were first proposed by Lamport [8]. They involve applying a hash function  ( ) ⋅ h  N 
times to a seed ( ) s  to form a hash chain of length N: 
1 2 1 ( ), ( ), , ( ), ( )
− …
N N h s h s h s h s          (1) 
The user calculates the i-th key according to this relation: 
( ) ( )
− =
N i
i k s h s             (2) 
The host authenticates the user by checking that the following equality holds: 
( )
1 ( ) ( )
− + =
N i
t h k s h s             (3) 
where the value h
N−i+1(s) is already saved in the host system’s file from the previous i-th authentication. After 
any successful authentication, the system password file is updated with the new key. This scheme has a 
limitation on the number of authentications, so that after reaching N authentications, a process restart is 
required. In addition, it is vulnerable to an opponent who sends small challenge values to users that 
respond with the chain initial values [9]. This attack can be referred to as a small challenge attack. 
Also, the users are charged with computational processes through the initialization phase, which makes 
the system unsuitable for WSNs. 
2.2. Bicakci et al.’s Scheme  
The infinite length hash chains (ILHC) proposed by [10] use a public-key algorithm, A, to produce a 
forward and infinite one way function (OWF). Bicakci et al. utilized RSA [11], where d is the private 
key and e is the public key. The OTP originating from initial input “s” using the RSA public-key 
algorithm for the i-th authentication is: 
( ) ( ) , =
i
i k s A s d       (4) 
and the verification of the i-th key is done by: 
( ) 1( ) , − = i i k s A k e             (5) 
increasing the number of cascaded exponentiations increases the computational complexity, making 
this algorithm very difficult to implement in limited computation devices [12]. 
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2.3. Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) 
If the integers  1 2 , , , … k n n n are pair-wise relatively prime, then the system of simultaneous congruence: 
1 1
2 2
mod
mod
        
mod
≡
≡
≡
￿
k k
x r n
x r n
x r n              
 (6) 
has a unique solution: 
1
1
mod
−
=
=∑
k
i i i
i
x rN N N where; 
1 =
=∏
k
i
i
N n
             
 (7) 
= i
i
N
N
n              
 (8) 
1 1mod
− ≡ i i i N N n             (9) 
2.4. TESLA Family Broadcast Authentication 
Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication (TESLA) [3] is a multicast stream authentication 
protocol.  Keys  used  to  authenticate  the  i-th  message  is  disclosed  along  with  (i  +  1)-th  message.  
µTESLA [4] provides authentication for data broadcasts, and requires that base station and sensor nodes be 
loosely time synchronized. According to Lamport’s scheme, a base station (BS) randomly selects the last 
key n k ,  the  chain  seed,  and  applies  a  one-way  public  function  ( ) ⋅ h  to  generate  the  rest  of  keys: 
0 1 1 , , , − … n k k k as  ( ) 1 + = i i k h k .  Given  i k ,  every  sensor  node  can  generate  the  sequence 0 1 1 , , , − … n k k k . 
However,  given i k ,  no  one  can  generate 1 + i k .  At  i-th  time  slot,  BS  sends  an  authenticated  message 
( )
i k MAC message . Sensor nodes store the message till the verification key in the (i + 1)-th time slot is 
disclosed. Sensor nodes verify disclosed key  1 + i k by using key  i k  as  ( ) 1 + = i i k h k . In µTESLA, nodes are 
required to store a message until the authentication key is disclosed. This operation may create storage 
problems, and encourages DoS types of attacks.  
µTESLA has been expanded to Multi-level µTESLA [4] by simplifying the key distribution phase and 
introducing  a  new  concept  of  a  multi-level  key  chain  generation  using  pseudo-random  functions  that 
improves  the  protocol  efficiency.  Multi-level  µTESLA  reduces  the  need  to  reinitialize  the  network  
(although  re-initialization  is  still  required)  by  implementing  multiple  levels  of  key  chains,  in  which  
high-level keys are used to communicate root-keys (or commitments) for low-level chains which are used 
in turn for broadcast authentication as in standard µTESLA. The chains are further connected in that each 
root-key  is  derived  from  the  corresponding  high-level  chain  using  another  pseudo-random  function. 
Network lifetime is extended many times over, but it is still limited. A problem would result if a receiver 
dropped a related commitment distribution message initializing a new low-level chain; it would be unable 
to verify any broadcast data received during this entire lifetime of the chain itself. The data would still be 
verifiable eventually as the receiver could use any later commitment distribution message to reconstruct all 
the  lost  high-level  keys  and  the  corresponding  chains.  This  would  require  significant  computation  
and storage. 
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2.5. CRTBA Broadcast Authentication 
The scheme proposed in [13] is divided into three phases: Distribution, Message Signing, and finally 
Message  Authentication  phase.  Before  deployment  all  nodes  are  loaded  with  the  chain  seed,  n k ,  the 
OWHF ( ) ⋅ h , and two different modules values,  A n and B n  for the CRT. When the BS needs to broadcast a 
message m to sensor nodes for the i-th session, BS calculates the MAC of the message m using  i k  to 
get ( ) =
i k M MAC m . After that BS cipher  i k  and M using the two secrets values  A n and B n through the 
CRT to get:  mod ≡ i A U k n and  mod ≡ B U M n , then it broadcast U . Upon the occurrence of U reception 
by sensor nodes, they recover  i k  from U, and then apply the OWHF ( ) ⋅ h , to check  ( )
?
i j
j i k h k
− = where  j k  
is the last authentic key that sensor nodes have received. Finally, to verify the message integrity, the sensor 
nodes compute the corresponding MAC using  i k  of the received message and then compare the result. 
Unfortunately, this scheme also has a length restriction considering the use of a backward hashing chain to 
generate keys. 
3. Required Attributes 
Here we list a number of desirable security attributes for authenticated broadcast: 
3.1. Data Integrity 
Data integrity ensures that data has not been altered by unauthorized entities.  
3.2. Data Origin Authentication  
Data Origin Authentication guarantees the origin of data. It is a fundamental step in achieving entity 
authentication in protocols as well as establishing keys. We may say that data origin authentication 
implies data integrity. So it is not possible to achieve data integrity without data origin authentication. 
3.3. Freshness  
Packets that have been captured and replayed at a later time should be ignored by the sensor nodes. 
3.4. Delay Tolerance  
No time synchronization should be required in the system for data verification. Each packet must be 
verifiable without having to wait for additional data.  
3.5. Confidentiality  
Confidentiality ensures that data is only available to those authorized to obtain it. 
3.6. Denial-of-Service Attack  
The denial of service attack is an attempt to make a node resource unavailable to its intended users. 
3.7. Small Challenge Attack  
This attack challenges the backward hashing with small values to respond with the chain initial values. Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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3.8. Limitation for an N times Authentications  
Process re-initialization after N of authentications is necessary. 
4. Our Approach  
The basic idea of our scheme is to expand Lamport’s scheme [8] with some modifications that 
produce the desirable infiniteness and forwardness, avoiding the use of public key cryptography. The 
shortcoming of those two parameters, infiniteness and forwardness, causes the insufficiency shown 
with respect to the previous work.  
Table 1. The Proposed Scheme Notation. 
Notation   Description  
( ) ⋅ A h   Represents the first hash function  
( ) ⋅ B h   Represents the second hash function  
( ) , i i x y   The nested hashing progress values for i-th authentication 
( ) ( )
i i y x
B A h h s
 
Hashing the seed by  ( ) ⋅ A h  for  i x times followed by  ( ) ⋅ B h hashing for  i y  times for the i-th session 
, i i x y k
  Session key for the i-th authentication  
U
   The encryption of the concatenated message with the session by the session key 
i P
   The podcasted packet for the i-th authentication 
X
  
The broadcasted chain indexes, calculated by the CRT 
crt s   The current seed 
nxt s   The next seed 
 
Thus we need to integrate Lamport’s scheme using two different one way hash functions,  ( ) ⋅ A h  and 
( ) ⋅ B h , one for the seed chain and the other for the session key’s production, as shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Session key production considering a nested hash chain using two different hashes. 
 
 
( ) ⋅ B h  
( ) ⋅ B h  
( ) seed s  
1 ( ) A h s  
2( )        ( ) …
x
A A h s h s
( )
1 2
2,1 ( ) = B A k h h s  
( )
2 2
2,2
 
( ) =
￿
B A k h h s
 
 
( )
2
2, ( ) =
y
y B A k h h s  Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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4.1. Key Pre-loading Phase 
Each node  j n is loaded with two unique CRT modules 
j
A
n r
 
and
j
B
n r . Those modules, regarding the all 
nodes, are relatively primes. Also all sensors are loaded with key seed s and the two different hash 
functions,  ( ) ⋅ A h  and  ( ) ⋅ B h . From the other way the base station is loaded with all this information 
considering  the  all  the  CRT  modules  for  all  the  network’s  nodes,  the  key  seed s ,  and  the  two 
different hash functions  ( ) ⋅ A h  and  ( ) ⋅ B h . 
4.2. Message Authentication. 
Before the broadcasting operation, BS has to do the following: 
(i)  Calculate the session key  ( ) ( ) ,
i i
i i
y x
x y B A k h h s =  for the i-th authentication. 
(ii)  Encrypt the broadcasted message m concatenated with the session key  , i i x y k with the session key 
to get  ( )
i i i y i x y x k k m E U , , =  
(iii)  Calculate the broadcasted chain indexes,  X , for the all  N nodes considering the CRT 
1
1
2
2
mod
mod
mod
mod
        
mod
mod
       
mod
mod
≡
≡
≡
≡
≡
≡
≡
≡
￿
￿
j
j
N
N
A
i n
B
i n
A
i n
B
i n
A
i n
B
i n
A
i n
B
i n
X x r
X y r
X x r
X y r
X x r
X y r
X x r
X y r
           
(10) 
The  BS  constructs  the  broadcasted  packet  to  be  ( ) { } X k m E P
i i i y i x y x k i , , = and  then  broadcast  it  to  
all sensors. 
4.3. Authentication Verification. 
Upon the reception of  i Pby the all sensors, they will need to ensure that the broadcast packets come 
from the authenticated BS. The verification process is done as follows: 
(i)  Each sensor node will extract  X  to perform the module operation to obtain the chain indexes, 
e.g.,  1 n will get 
1 mod ≡
A
i n x X r and 
1 mod ≡
B
i n y X r . 
(ii)  After getting the chain indexes, they will perform the key generation according to these indexes 
by using the two different hash functions to get this  ( ) ( ) , =
i i
i i
y x
x y B A k h h s . 
(iii)  By decrypting ( )
, x y i i k D U , sensors will be able to get the message m and the session key  , i i x y k . Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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(iv)  Then the sensor nodes need to compare the two sessions they have established and received, if 
the comparison is positive, then sensor nodes will recover the message. Otherwise the received 
broadcast message has been altered. The message integrity also checked implicitly through the 
authentication verification, that way tampering with U in a way of message modification will 
sequentially affect the received session key.  
(v)  After the completion of one session, sensor nodes and BS have to update the current seed to the 
next one:  
( ) ( ) =
i x
nxt A crt s h s
            (11) 
Figure 2. The Proposed Broadcasting Authentication Scheme in Wireless Sensor Network. 
 
5. Performance Analysis 
In this section, we are going to analyze the performance of our algorithm with respect to the storage 
and computational cost [14]. 
5.1. Storage Analysis 
The storage complexity is the amount of memory (RAM size) required to store security credentials. 
The storage complexity affects the hardware price of sensor nodes. Our proposal requires the base 
station to save two keys for each sensor nodes to build the conference X , two different hash functions 
( ) ⋅ A h  and ( ) ⋅ B h , and one seed . s This storage overhead is neglected to the base station, since the base 
station  regarded  as  resource-rich  node.  In  the  other  way,  sensor  node  j n  has  to  store  two  privet 
keys
j
A
n r and 
j
B
n r , and one seed s , each one of them is 160-bit . This tells us that the memory required 
for  credentials  per  module  (RAM)  is  160  ×  3-bit  =  480-bit  =  60-bytes.  Hash  functions  ( ) ⋅ A h  and Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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( ) ⋅ B h are  implemented,  written  in  nesC  code  for  TinyOS,  in  approximately  20  Kbyte  of  
memory (ROM.) 
5.2. Computation Analysis 
Considering the computational complexity, base station has to build the congruent equation (10) to 
reach the chain indexes for all sensors,  X , also it has to perform two different hash operations to build the 
session key  , i i x y k  this computation is affordable in the base station. Alternatively sensor nodes have to do 
two  different  modulo  operation  and  to  perform  the  same  two  different  hash  operations  according 
to ( ) ⋅ A h and ( ) ⋅ B h . This also is very easy to the sensor nodes. Rather than the previous techniques which use 
backward hash functions. Those previous techniques cost the sensor nodes to perform hashing operations 
for many times, especially through the chain initial values. 
Example:  Considering  the  chain  length  to  be  N  =  1,000  the  number  of  required  hash  operation 
considering Lamport scheme will be. (N + 1) × (N/2) = 500,500. On the contrary the usage of nested 
hashing will require the sensors to perform 2N  hash operations which are equal to 2,000, according to our 
illustration. This could show how the nested hashing using two different hash chains is very cheap, in a 
very simple way. 
Now,  we  consider  the  required  execution  time  for  a  sensor  node  to  calculate  the  session  key 
( ) ( ) , =
i i
i i
y x
x y B A k h h s  . The utilization of the microprocessor Sparc(400) as the sensor nodes’ platform, will 
give us the following: the required time to digitize a plain text of size 80 bytes using MD5 will cost us  
a = 39 µs and also, the required time to digitize a plain text of size 64 bytes using SHA-1 will cost us  
b  =  56  µs  as  shown  in  Table  2  [15], such that the total time  required  to  calculate the session  key 
( ) ( ) , =
i i
i i
y x
x y B A k h h s  is  exec i i t a x b y = × + × . Considering that the maximum values for  i x and  i y are  10 w = , 
hence texec = 10(56 + 39) = 0.95 ms. Note we have considered the worst case, hence we have considered the 
largest input plaintext for the both two hash algorithms, but in fact the plain text size will be no more than 
160-bits = 20-bytes, rather than the 80 bytes or 64 bytes.  
Table 2. Execution times [µs] for two different hash algorithms, platforms and plaintext 
sizes [bytes]. 
Algorithm  Size   Atmega103   Atmega128   M16C/10   StrongARM   Xscale(400)   Xscale(200)   Sparc(440)  
MD5   0   5,863   1,466   1,083   46   26   53   23  
  1:26   5,890   1,473   1,075   46   26   53   23  
  62:80   10,888   2,722   2,011   74   45   90   39  
SHA-1   1   15,249   3,812   2,651   69   51   102   27  
  3   15,781   3,945   5,303   69   50   103   27  
  65  14543  3636  7955  133  102  205  55 
  64   31,107   7,777   10,907   145   103   207   56  
 
However, the time required for individual modulo operations mod
j
A
n r andmod
j
B
n r  for node  j n  is tiny 
compared to the calculation of the two different hash operations. Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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6. Security Analysis  
According to the security attributes we have mentioned above, we are going to evaluate our approach: 
6.1. Data Integrity 
An implicit check for data integrity has been provided. Any data modifications that could be done will 
consequently  affect  the  received  vector ( )
i i i y i x y x k k m E U , , =  which  will  be  discovered  through  the  key 
checking, by comparing the two sessions they have established and received.  
6.2. Data Origin Authentication 
Sending an original copy of the session key concatenated with the message and then encrypting them 
with the same key provides the originality authentication in a straightforward way. No one has the ability to 
build the broadcasted packet ( ) { } X k m E P
i i i y i x y x k i , , =  except for the base-station or an intruder that has 
captured the entire congruence keys 
j
A
n r and
j
B
n r  for all nodes. This broadcast message has to provide the 
positivity authentication check considering the all sensor nodes.  
6.3. Freshness 
Our proposal allows the base station to challenge the sensor nodes with unpredictable uniformly 
distributed values of (xi, yi). According to these values, and according to the seed updating every session, 
new refreshed keys have been established every session, so the communication system has a new and 
refreshed session key, and previous messages cannot be replayed. If we suppose that xi and yi can take 
one value of forward m values, the probability of successfully guessing a challenge will be the joint 
probability of xi and yi, which is equal to 1/m
2. We can refer to this property as the ability to resist 
predictable attacks. 
6.4. Delay Tolerance 
Our  proposed  scheme  provides  an  instant  authentication.  Every  broadcasted  packet  contains  the 
authentication  information  for  itself,  independently  of  previous  and  following  messages.  The 
authentication process is done in the same session. 
6.5. Confidentiality 
Confidentiality cannot be guaranteed if one or more nodes have been compromised. If an intruder 
acquires the ability to capture one node or more he will be able to solve the congruent equation using the 
captured node  j n congruent keys 
j
A
n r and
j
B
n r . The CRTBA [13] algorithm also did not cover this property, 
furthermore the broadcasted messages are sent in the plain form without encryption. Actually, regarding 
certain applications like the broadcasting of urgent alert notifications and warning systems need instant 
message authentication rather than confidentiality. 
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6.6. Denial of Service Attacks 
In  µTESLA  scheme,  the  sensor  nodes  can’t  authenticate  the  received  message  immediately  after 
reception. The intruder can send a large amount of forged messages to consume the sensor nodes buffer. 
The instant authentication provided in our scheme, overcomes this weakness. The authentication process 
is done in the same session independently of the previous or the next sessions. This vulnerability is 
overcome without resources an extra bandwidth or an extra storage memory like [5] and [6]. 
6.7. Limitation for an N times Authentications 
All TESLA families and also CRTBA, use backward hash chain. The backward chain has a restriction 
of  an  N  time  for  authentications;  a  process  restart  is  required  after  reaching  this  number  of 
authentications. Our algorithm utilizes a new technique of employing two nested and different hash 
functions for the key production. This technique uses forward hashing and has no need for process 
restarting after reaching any number of authentications. 
6.8. Small Challenge Attack 
Utilizing a one way hash function to construct a hashing chain in the backward fashion encourages a 
new kind of attack called small challenge attack. This type of attack discloses the hash chain initial 
values. These initial values help the intruder to extract the remaining chain values by hashing those initial 
values.  Our  algorithm  covers  this  vulnerability  by  the  utilization  of  two  different  and  nested  hash 
functions in the forward fashion, which prevents this kind of attack. 
6.9. Brute Force Attack 
The ability of generating a truly random sequence of key bits can defeat a brute force attack, as a 
brute  force  attack  would  have  no  way  of  distinguishing  one  key  from  the  other.  Relying  on  the 
generation of random number can impede the brute force. The nested hashing progress random values 
for i-th authentication (xi, yi). play a great role in preventing this type of attacks according to the 
entropy of their random generation. 
7. Conclusions 
A new wireless sensor network broadcast authentication scheme based on forward hashing using two 
different nested hashes and the Chinese Reminder Theorem (CRT) has been presented. The broadcasting 
messages are built using the congruence of the CRT. The two different hashing systems are utilized in 
the session key generation in a forward and unlimited way. This scheme achieves better characteristics 
than the other schemes, we discussed. Our proposal is not limited to a certain number of authentications, 
and  also  does  not  involve  computationally  expensive  techniques  (PKC)  to  provide  infiniteness.  A 
detailed security analysis has been performed that covers many types of attacks that could influence our 
scheme. Our scheme satisfies all the security attributes, we have discussed, except for the confidentiality 
in case of one node or more has been captured. This scheme is applicable for alerting and warning 
systems that need instant broadcast authentication rather than message confidentiality. Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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